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Abstract 
Following the UK’s 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union (EU), a narrative 
emerged positioning Baby Boomers as ‘to blame’ for the result, which drew largely on a pre-existing 
claim that this generation is responsible for a range of contemporary social problems. Using cultural 
script analyses of the ‘Baby Boomer problem’, this paper considers the development of this narrative 
and its implications for the sociology of knowledge. A study of newspaper articles published around 
the time of the EU Referendum finds that the Baby Boomer motif is employed as a metaphorical 
shorthand for a range of ‘troubling conditions’ (Mills 1970), including economic crises, cultural 
conflicts, and political divisions. The escalating rhetoric of ‘Boomer-blaming’ pursued by 
claimsmaking organisations has sought to consolidate and extend a sentiment of generational 
grievance, which informs wider claims about a political divide between old and young. One 
consequence has been the weaponisation of the concept of generation: a development that 







Since the turn of the Millennium, claims regarding intergenerational (in)equity, (in)justice, and 
(un)fairness have gained prominence in political and media discourse. A previous study (Bristow 
2015) explored the aetiology of these claims, finding them to be explicitly connected to wider 
anxieties about economic crises, public spending, and the welfare state, in the context of an ageing 
society. Furthermore, that study suggested that the construction of the Baby Boomer generation 
specifically​ as a social problem in Britain reflected implicit, existential anxieties about the social and 
cultural legacy of the Sixties.  
More recent developments have revealed an escalation of claimsmaking activity with regard to the 
problem of ‘intergenerational fairness’, and a focus on some distinct areas of economic, cultural, and 
political life (Bristow 2019). These include, among other things​,​ the cost of housing; the 
‘affordability’ of pensions; political participation and representation; and Higher Education funding 
and levels of student debt. Generational claimsmaking has proceeded in a context of political crisis, 
precipitated by the ‘Leave’ vote in the 2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union (EU), and followed by tumultuous national elections in the USA and Continental Europe. In 
response to these events, it has been widely claimed that age, and/or generation, has become ‘the 
new dividing line’ in politics (Curtis 2017). 
But what does it mean to talk about age – or generation – becoming ‘a great fault line’ (P. Moore 
2016) in events such as the EU Referendum? In one respect, this claim could be seen as a simple 
reflection of polling data, which revealed a correlation between older age and voting Leave, and 
between younger age and voting Remain. For example, the polling organisation YouGov found that, 
of those who voted on 23 June 2016, 29% of 18-24-year-olds voted Leave, compared to 64% of 
over-65s. However, this consensus is complicated by the caveat that, among the majority of the 
voting population, the ‘age divide’ was rather less stark, with 46% of voters aged 25 to 49 voting 
Leave, and 40% of voters between the ages of 50 and 64 voting Remain. A correlation was also 
revealed between voting preferences and levels of educational qualification, and also between 
voting preferences and regional location (P. Moore 2016). 
Given the divisive character of the EU Referendum overall, it might seem curious that the ‘age 
divide’ should emerge as a key concern for commentators. It is more curious still that the extremes 
of the ‘age divide’ between the oldest and youngest sections of the voting population were often 
presented in terms of a wider clash of generational interests: in particular, between the ‘Baby 
Boomers’ (born in the two decades following the end of the Second World War) and the ‘Millennials’ 




have slammed Baby Boomers for voting Britain out of the EU’ (Matthews 2016) exemplify the tenor 
of this narrative. In this framing of the age divide as a ​generational​ divide, the votes of the entire 
Baby Boomer cohort – aged between around 51 and 70 at the time of the Referendum – were elided 
with those of the oldest voters (aged 65+), while the votes of the entire Millennial cohort – aged 
between around 16 and 35 at the time of the Referendum – were elided with those of the youngest, 
18-24 category.  
Based on an analysis of reports and commentaries in the UK national newspapers in the months 
immediately leading up to, and following, the EU Referendum, this paper investigates the 
characteristics of the ‘generation divide’ narrative surrounding this event. It finds that this was not 
merely a discussion of the ‘facts’ revealed by polling data, but a symbolic debate, in which economic 
and political conflicts are represented as a generational conflict. As such, post-Brexit Boomer 
blaming can be seen as a case, not so much of generations, but of ​generationalism: ‘​[t]he systematic 
appeal to the concept of generation in narrating the social and political’ (White 2013, p. 216; Wohl 
1980).  
In analysing the development of generationalist thinking following the Brexit vote, this paper 
considers the role of claimsmaking organisations and moral entrepreneurs in the construction of a 
cultural script that attributes the size, age, attitudes, or behaviour of the Baby Boomer generation to 
a range of ‘troubling conditions’ (Mills 1970) experienced in the present day. The construction of the 
‘Baby Boomer generation’ as a social problem is intriguing, as it does not obviously relate to a 
particular form of ‘deviant’ behaviour (Becker 1997), or to a clearly defined group of ‘folk devils’ 
(Cohen 2011), but to a large and heterogeneous group of people born at around the same time. 
However, my analysis suggests that the existence of a cultural script positioning of the Boomers as a 
problematic person-type (Loseke 2003), based primarily on their generational location, allowed for 
the ‘piggybacking’ (Best 2017) of a subsequent claim that the Boomers were to blame for Brexit, by 
some who considered the Leave vote to be deviant behaviour. 
Generationalism, here, is understood as a ‘simplified and exaggerated view of generation’ (Purhonen 
2016, p. 96), which results in deterministic presentation of particular generations as the cause of 
(and/or solution to) social and cultural problems. As White (2013) has argued, this simplified view 
can be put to a number of political ends, including: the construction of a new vocabulary of division 
and collectivism, providing ‘a way to speak to those presumed no longer reachable with a class 
vocabulary’ (White 2013, p. 235); the avoidance of discussion about other social divisions and 




taken by generationalism in the present context requires that we engage with the various ways in 
which the concept of ‘generation’ itself is understood and deployed.  
Generation is a complex and multi-faceted concept, the meaning of which is intimately linked to the 
discipline, or even branch of discipline, that is studying it (Kertzer 1983). Within social science, it has 
a dual meaning, ‘referring to both family and kinship structures on the one hand, and cohorts (or age 
sets) on the other’ (Burnett 2010, p. 1). It is also powerfully informed by Karl Mannheim’s theory of 
‘The Problem of Generations’, published in the 1920s within a collection of ‘Essays on the Sociology 
of Knowledge’ (Mannheim 1952; Pilcher 1994; Spitzer 1973). Mannheim formulated the problem of 
generations in terms of the problem of consciousness: how people who come of age in particular 
historical epochs work up their experiences; and how knowledge is transmitted, received, and 
renewed by the interaction between ‘new participants in the cultural process’ (Mannheim 1952, p. 
292) and the society into which these participants are born and develop, and which they, in turn, 
transform.  
By situating the concept of generation within the sociology of knowledge, we are able to appreciate 
that generations are both constructed by, and portrayed as representative of, the social, cultural, 
and political events of their time. As such, they have a symbolic, rather than simply biological, 
existence (Mannheim 1952; Nash 1978; Wohl 1980). In ‘thinking generations’ (White 2013), 
contemporary society is working through ideas about historical events and present-day problems. 
This has had a powerful impact on framing debates about social problems and inequalities – in 
particular, those debates concerned with the fortunes of younger and older people.  
Scholars and advocacy organisations have critiqued the ways in which stereotypes and ‘myths’ about 
the Baby Boomers have been deployed to construct older people as a problem (Auer 2013; 
Phillipson et al. 2008; Lodge et al. 2016; Ready for Ageing Alliance 2015; Walker 1996), and have 
drawn attention to the ‘casual use of demonising and divisive language’ used with regard to Baby 
Boomers in the wake of the Brexit vote (Allen 2017). However, little attention has been paid to the 
how ​such stereotypes of Baby Boomers and older people – and by extension, Millennials and 
younger people – came to play such a prominent role in debates surrounding the EU Referendum, or 
to the implications of this for the concept of generation itself.  
Methodology 
This paper presents some recent findings from an ongoing study of the role of claimsmakers in the 
construction of the Baby Boomer generation as a social problem. Situated within the constructivist 




conceptual grounding of generations within the sociology of knowledge, the study seeks to 
understand how a social phenomenon (in this case, the particular generation known as the ‘Baby 
Boomers’) has become represented as a cause of myriad difficulties facing society in general, and 
particularly young people, in the present day. This endeavour requires a methodological approach 
that allows us to identify the characteristics and aetiology of this claim, within its wider social, 
cultural, and political context.  
To this end, the study has analysed the discursive framing of the Baby Boomer generation within 
articles published in UK national newspapers over a period of time. By studying national newspapers, 
we are able to explore how claims about the Baby Boomer generation are constructed and amplified 
through elite cultural channels, in the context of wider events that make and shape the news. ‘The 
news’ is produced and consumed across a range of platforms, including radio, television, websites, 
and social media; however, there are some compelling methodological reasons for a focus on 
newspapers here. National newspapers – unlike social media – are elite products, subject to editorial 
direction and partisan loyalties, meaning that claims tend to be framed by the newspaper’s ‘editorial 
line’. In contrast to website-based news, archived newspaper articles are relatively stable, and less 
likely to change after initial publication. Unlike much broadcast media, print media has a discursive 
quality that allows us to analyse the arguments of individual journalists, who can play a significant 
role in the claimsmaking process.  
A large, initial study provides the background to the findings presented in this paper (Bristow 2015). 
Qualitative media analysis (Altheide 1996) was conducted of the text of articles appearing in the 
British national news press between January 1985 and December 2011, and indexed in the 
LexisNexis database, which used the terms ‘baby’ AND ‘Boomer’. That study found that journalistic 
narratives have connected Baby Boomers with a range of wider anxieties about economic issues, 
welfare resources, and cultural conflicts, and that this connection has become more explicit and 
causally-framed in the context of recent economic crises. Such claims do not appear to reflect 
partisan positions, or the ‘editorial lines’ of particular newspapers.  
 
Since completion of the initial study, news reports and commentary have reflected a consolidation 
of the claim that Western societies are witnessing a new era of generational conflict, in particular 
between two generations: the ‘Baby Boomers’ and the ‘Millennials’ (Bristow 2019). As noted above, 
the apparent ‘age divide’ in voting preferences around the EU Referendum was widely reported as 
evidence of the existence, and depth, of this deeper conflict, in a context where national 





To investigate the characteristics of this latter narrative, a further, small study analysed a dataset of 
articles drawn from all UK national newspapers, between the dates of 1 May and 30 September 
2016, using the terms ‘Baby Boomer’ AND ‘Millennial’. Again, these were analysed using qualitative 
media analysis, a method that blends ‘the traditional notion of ​objective content analysis ​with 
participant observation​ to form ​ethnographic content analysis​, or how a researcher interacts with 
documentary materials so that specific statements can be placed in the proper context for analysis’ 
(Altheide 1996, p. 2, emphasis in original). This method thus allows for a ‘contextual constructionist’ 
approach to the study of social problems, which does not focus on the language alone, but engages 
with the meaning it derives from the social problem under consideration, and how this problem 
comes to be framed (Best 2003; Berger and Luckmann 1991). The sample’s timeframe was chosen to 
capture the discourse surrounding the EU Referendum, and the search terms were chosen to include 
articles that did not explicitly discuss the Brexit vote, thereby allowing for an analysis of the wider 
context in which discussions about comparisons and conflict between the two generations appear. 
The dataset comprised national broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, whose editorial positions 
represented both sides of the Leave/Remain divide.  
 
An initial search of the LexisNexis database yielded 153 results. After reviewing for relevance and 
repetition, the final dataset consisted of 107 articles, which were read and coded according to main 
themes and sub-themes. A thematic review of the findings is presented below, followed by a 
discussion of their significance to a wider analysis of the social construction of the problem of 
generations. Exemplifying headlines and standfirsts are noted to illustrate the narrative form of 
particular claims, along with the title of the newspaper and the article’s publication date.  
 
Findings 
The following main themes were identified:  economic inequality (n. 24); housing (n. 15); pensions 
(n. 2); Brexit (n. 14); UK politics (n. 8); US election (n. 9); culture (n. 8); lifestyle and growing up (n. 
19); Boomer-blaming (n. 3); and work (n. 5). The articles did not, of course, fit into these categories 
tidily, with many themes appearing simultaneously. For example, one opinion piece in the 
Independent ​leads with the following standfirst:  
Older readers are saying that young people should simply adjust their expectations 
downwards. That would be rather rich considering the extent to which the expectations of 
the over-sixties are being catered to by politicians, whether through a generous ‘triple lock’ 




construction, or even pulling the UK out of the European Union when most people under 30 
want to stay. (Chu 2016)  
However, most of the articles analysed (comprising news reports, opinion pieces, and letters to the 
editor) contained a discernible focus, which can be categorised by three overall themes: (i) the 
‘economic divide’ between the generations; (ii) the ‘generational divide’ in politics; and (iii) ‘cultural 
differences’ between the generations.  
The ‘economic divide’ between the generations 
The largest group of articles counterposed the economic situation confronting Millennials with that 
allegedly enjoyed by the Baby Boomer generation. Specifically, these related to: ​young people’s 
earnings​ (‘Millennials earn £8,000 less in their 20s than their parents, study warns; And a post-Brexit 
downturn could depress millennials' wages even further’, ​Independent​ 18/7/16); ​the distribution of 
welfare resources​ (‘Tory tax and benefit plans “widen generation divide”; Split seen in EU 
referendum will worsen as cash redistributed to the old, independent analysis finds’, ​Observer 
3/7/16); ​the rate of inflation​ (‘Inflation is three times higher for under-30 Millennials than retirees 
thanks to the rising cost of rent, smartphones, meals out and uni’, ​Mail​ 10/5/16); and ​access to new 
technology​ (‘For Millennials, Pokémon is no substitute for a decent home and income’, ​Independent 
20/7/16).  
The Brexit vote was presented as a ​harbinger of future economic inequality between the 
generations​ (‘Millennials will see two recessions before the age of 30; Brexit is turning a clash of 
generations into a crisis; The generations with the least to lose have piled economic misery on young 
people's heads’, ​Independent​ 24/6/16), and ​an urgent justification for a policy focus on 
‘intergenerational equity’​ (‘After Brexit, we must strengthen the ties between young and old; That 
responsibility has been taken far too lightly in recent years with little attention paid to the 
intergenerational impact of big public policy decisions’, ​Observer​ 3/7/16). 
The articles on housing focused variously on ​home ownership​ (‘Millennials aren't buying homes 
right now. What if they never do?’, ​Guardian​ 27/5/16); ​the cost of renting​ (‘Under 30s charged 
£44,000 more on rent than their parents; If it feels like you're spending all your money on rent and 
your parents had it easy, you're right’, ​Mirror​ 16/7/16); and ​living at home with parents​ (‘Forget 
granny flats – now more graduates and young adults live with their parents than with flatmates or 
partners’, ​Telegraph​ 30/8/16). A handful of articles reported on ​inheritance​ (‘Selfish Baby Boomers: 




These articles reflect an established cultural script that situate the Baby Boomer generation as a 
cause of the social and economic problems of the present day (Bristow 2015). They also, however, 
reflect recent, energetic claimsmaking activity carried out by the Intergenerational Commission (IC). 
The IC was established by the Resolution Foundation think-tank between 2016 and 2018, to draw 
together ‘leaders from business, academia and policy-making’ to ‘explore the questions of 
intergenerational fairness that are currently rising up the agenda’ and ‘devise a means of repairing 
the social contract between generations’ (Intergenerational Commission 2018). Its first report, 
Stagnation Generation: The case for renewing the intergenerational contract ​(Gardiner 2016a) was 
launched in July 2016, with a press release headlined: ‘Millennials facing “generational pay penalty” 
as their earnings fall £8,000 behind during their 20s’ (Resolution Foundation 2016). The analytical 
device employed in this report – and reflected in the IC’s subsequent publications – was to compare 
the economic fortunes of the ‘Millennial’ generation with those of older generations, finding that the 
Millennials’ current situation and future prospects are relatively worse. As such, the IC’s research 
seeks to re-frame the ​economic​ conflicts, over wages, property prices, and pay progression that 
characterise the current UK context of austerity and stagnant economic growth, as ​generational 
conflicts related to ‘fairness’.  
The ‘generational divide’ in politics 
A number of articles presented the Brexit vote in terms of a clash of political interests between the 
generations.​ ​Some discussed the ​apparent political divide ​within ​generations​ in the context of 
campaigning around the US presidential election (‘American voters are more polarized than they 
have been in 46 years – and it's MILLENNIALS driving the divide’, ​Mail​ 7/9/16); however, in the UK 
context, such intragenerational distinctions were rarely discussed. The suggestion that ​older 
generations had an unfair democratic advantage​ in the EU Referendum was consolidated in later 
articles, which reported the Intergenerational Commission’s claim that the Baby Boomers’ relatively 
large cohort size, combined with their relatively high rates of voter turnout, resulted in a ‘four 
million person ballot box advantage’ for the Boomers in the 2015 General Election (Gardiner 2016b). 
This gave rise to headlines such as: ‘Voting turnout gap between old and young widening – report’ 
(​Guardian​ 23/9/16), and ‘Democracy at risk as Baby Boomers dominate voting’ (​i-Independent 
23/9/16). 
A number of articles presented the Leave vote as a generalised ​extension of alleged Boomer evils 
(‘Baby Boomers will add insult to injury if they vote to leave the EU, ​Independent​ 23/6/16), and a 
‘betrayal’ of younger generations​ (‘Young people on the EU referendum: “It is the end of one world, 




older generation who turned their backs on Europe but who will not be around to see the damage 
wreaked’, ​Observer​ 26/6/16). One article reported on the eruption of an​ online squabble between 
Boomers and Millennials ​(‘War on Millennials! Baby Boomers take to Twitter to point out the flaws 
of the younger generation with #HowToConfuseAMillenial hashtag’, ​Mail​ 5/9/16). Others, however, 
aired ​disquiet about the Boomer-blaming​ (‘We're all playing the Brexit blame game’, ​Telegraph 
27/6/16; ‘Don't blame the Baby Boomers if their children are have-nots; Boomer bashing has 
become a new form of bigotry’,​ Telegraph, ​19/7/16).  
‘Cultural differences’ between generations 
Discussion of apparent cultural differences between younger and older generations reflects an 
enduring interest by the news media in the generational framing of cultural trends, and the 
consolidation of stereotypes around particular generational categories (for example, ‘Baby Boomer’ 
and ‘Millennial’). These included reflections on ​young people’s alleged over-sensitivity and 
reluctance to grow up​ (‘Has politically correct culture gone too far?… Dave Schilling… wanders into 
the very unsafe space that is the schism between millennials and their predecessors’, ​Guardian 
16/5/16; ‘Lessons in how to raise an adult; Today's students are so mollycoddled they are unable to 
stand on their own feet, says Julie Lythcott-Haims’, ​i-Independent​ 16/6/16).  
 
Reports that young people ​no longer engage in the hedonistic behaviour associated with the Baby 
Boomers​ generated a number of headlines (‘They don't drink, smoke or go clubbing: they're the new 
young fogeys’, ​Times​, 13/6/16; ‘A case of no sex please, we're totes millennials’; ​Sun​ 13/8/16; 
‘Revealed: Millennials spend more on “health” foods and drink less than previous generations but 
are more likely to be obese and struggle to lose weight when older’, ​Mail​ 3/6/16). Apparent 
generational differences in the workplace​ provoked some reports (‘Why having a millennial as your 
boss might solve the gender pay gap problem’, ​Independent​ 24/8/16; ‘Millennials have created a 
generation of “work martyrdom” and don't use all their vacation days, report says’, ​Mail​ 26/8/16).  
 
The consolidation and extension of generational grievance  
Overall, this thematic categorisation indicates that media discussions about ‘Baby Boomers’ and 
‘Millennials’ are linked with a wide range of specific news topics, and that the assumption of an 
economic and political conflict between the two generations has become an established trope. 
When we look beneath the headlined themes to a closer examination of the content of the articles, 
we can isolate three related characteristics of the ‘generational conflict’ narrative. First, it relies on a 




used – to denote particular cohorts, kinship relations, life stage, or historical period – and using the 
term ‘generation’ interchangeably with ‘age’. Second, it ​consolidates a pre-existing sentiment of 
generational grievance​, relying on a claim of Baby Boomers’ culpability for economic and political 
problems to make the generalised claim that the Boomers have ‘betrayed’ the younger generation. 
Third, it interacts with significant ​claimsmaking activity​ that seeks to politicise generational divisions.  
 
These three characteristics were apparent before the Brexit vote. However, as discussed below, the 
discursive framing of the EU referendum in terms of generational conflict both illustrated the 
influence of generationalism in making sense of current socio-political events, and extended its 
impact. In some cases, those wishing to promote the claim of a conflict of interests between the 
generations deployed the Brexit vote as a dramatic example of such polarised interests. In others, 
those opposed to the result of the referendum drew upon claims of intergenerational ‘injustice’ to 
gain moral authority for their position.  
 
Looking first at the promiscuous use of the term ‘generation’, we see that the label ‘Baby Boomer 
generation’ is used interchangeably with the elastic and relative category of ‘older generation’: as in, 
‘This vote doesn't represent the younger generation who will have to live with the consequences: 
Millennials vent fury at Baby Boomers for voting Britain OUT of the EU’ (​Mail​ 24/6/16); ‘The 
over-fifties have gambled away my generation's future. We must not stand for this’ (​Independent 
27/6/16). This conceptual slippage obscures the differences in voting preference between members 
of different generations, and uses the concept of generation as a crude proxy for age. We see this in 
the wider discussion of economic inequality between the generations, where the terms ‘Baby 
Boomer’, ‘pensioner’, ‘the old’, and ‘older generation’ are frequently used interchangeably – 
implying simultaneously that all Boomers are the dependent elderly, and that all old people are 
affluent Boomers.  
Such conceptual slippage is sometimes acknowledged by claimsmakers, but considered to be 
justifiable within the wider context of the Boomer-blaming. James Moore (2016a), writing in the 
Independent​, refers to a piece that he wrote before the EU referendum (J. Moore 2016b), in which 
he suggested ‘that if the Baby Boomers ended up forcing a Brexit they would be delivering a slap to 
the faces of their Millennial grandchildren’. He admits that in that previous article, he was ‘dealing in 
generalisations’: ‘There are Millennials who voted out, and a lot of their grandparents (including I'm 




But from a generational perspective the point remains valid, because that's just what the 
Boomers, as group, did. Free higher education, copper bottomed pensions, cheap housing, 
and so on. They've have had a great ride and they've capped it by kicking their inheritors in 
the teeth. (J. Moore 2016a) 
A ​Telegraph​ report headlined ‘Millennials' “fury” over Baby Boomers' vote for Brexit’ (Boult 2016) 
cited a number of tweets criticising ‘the older generation’ for voting in a different way to ‘the 
younger generation’. For example: ‘Jokes aside I'm actually scared. Today an older generation has 
voted to ruin the future for the younger generation’; ‘The older generation picks what happens, the 
younger generation has to live with it’; ‘The fact older generations have reaped the benefits & pulled 
the EU from my generation? Furious. My generation wanted in. It's our time’; ‘im actually really 
upset how selfish the older generations have been’ (Boult 2016).  
None of the tweets cited by Boult explicitly mentioned the ‘Baby Boomers’, but his article​ ​quoted 
Yorkshire Post​ columnist Grant Woodward: ‘Brexit will come to be seen as the Baby Boomers' 
ultimate betrayal of younger generations and those that will follow. A knee-jerk response to a series 
of red herrings, a protest vote with the potential for long-term catastrophe that they won't be 
around to endure’ (cited in Boult, 2016). Woodward’s ​Yorkshire Post​ article, however, begins by 
recounting a conversation with his father: ‘a man who was born just before the outbreak of the 
Second World War but who has shared the same benefits as the Baby Boomers who followed in his 
wake after peace broke out across Europe’ (Woodward 2016). We can see in this example that the 
‘Baby Boomer’ – even when used with reference to a close family member – is used to denote an 
ideal person-type, rather than an actual member of the ‘Boomer’ birth cohort. It is this symbolic 
construction, however, that drives the headline of Boult’s (2016) article.  
A related conceptual slippage is revealed by the use of the kinship sense of generations – parents 
and children – to present alleged inequalities between Baby Boomers and Millennials. For example: 
‘Baby Boomers, you have already robbed your children of their future. Don't make it worse by voting 
for Brexit’ (​Independent​ 22/6/16); ‘The new inequality: Are you part of the first generation EVER to 
earn less than your parents?’ (​Mirror​ 18/7/16); ‘Young renters £44,000 out of pocket by the age of 
30 compared to their parents’ (​Independent ​18/7/16). The counterposition of ‘parents’ to ‘children’ 
gives claims about generational conflict an intimate, personalised quality, adding a dramatic ​frisson 
to comparisons of the relative fortunes of birth cohorts, by representing them as acts of parental 
harm or neglect. This is apparent in a number of the opinion pieces within the dataset, where 
journalists make self-conscious reference to their own location within the ‘younger generation’, 




claim. It should be noted, however, that claims about the problem of the ‘Baby Boomers’ are not 
only, or even primarily, made by Millennial writers, but have also been popularised by Baby Boomers 
themselves (for example, Beckett 2010; Willetts 2010).  
By drawing on an established narrative that presented young people as being ​generally​ victimised by 
their elders, such interpretations of the Brexit vote consolidated and extended an existing sentiment 
of generational grievance. In the present-day cultural script, the Boomers are presented as a 
problem not only because they are seen, ​as a generation​, to have enjoyed certain advantages and 
done certain things, but because of the ​kind of people ​they are seen to be. This lends the discourse 
of the Baby Boomers a distinctly emotive quality. As Loseke (2003) explains, the construction and 
categorisation of social problems often ‘simultaneously construct the types of ​people ​who inhibit 
those categories’, and ‘discursive productions of people-types simultaneously construct preferred 
emotional orientations ​and responses toward the constructed categories’ (Loseke 2003, pp. 120-1, 
emphasis in original). This is evident in the construction of the Baby Boomer caricature as the 
archetypal ‘villain’ in the narrative of generational conflict, with the caricatured ‘Millennial’ assigned 
the symbolic role of ‘victim’. In this vein, Charlie Cooper wrote in the ​Independent​:  
Long before the referendum was even called, the young had good reason for grievance. The 
Baby Boomers (and, to a lesser extent, Generation X), having enjoyed the benefits of free 
higher education and sitting on homes acquired while the going was good, were the 
architects of a financial crash that laid waste to the economy we millennials were only just 
becoming active participants in…. While our parents' generation sat pretty on their housing 
investments, looking forward to generous state pensions and protected pensioners' benefits, 
we saw public services cut and under-25s were even denied the national ‘living wage’. Oh, 
and thanks for introducing, and then trebling, university tuition fees. (Cooper 2016) 
The presumption that the Leave vote represented the latest skirmish in a conflict of sectional 
interests between the ‘older’ and ‘younger’ generations rapidly escalated into claims that about the 
‘unfairness’ of older people having an equal say in ‘the future’. Writing that ‘anger and despair was 
echoed by young people around the country, who chose overwhelmingly to stay inside Europe and 
now feel betrayed by the older voters who secured victory for Brexit’, the ​Observer ​quoted Phoebe 
Warneford-Thomson, ‘an 18-year-old from Bristol who, along with most of her friends, voted to stay 
in the EU’: ‘I feel quite bitter that the older generation can celebrate victory, while young people 
have suffered such defeat and will have to live longest with this decision’ (Graham-Harrison 2016). 
Judith Woods (2016), writing in the ​Telegraph​ about ‘the Brexit blame game’, quoted her 




betrayed by their inward-looking elders’: ‘“Why were old people even allowed to vote? I mean, 
they'll all be dead soon”’.  
The recurring sentiment that older generations should have less of a say on matters of the future 
than younger generations because they will not as have long to ‘live with the consequences’, raises 
some troubling implications. Here, the established rhetorical claim that the Baby Boomers ‘took their 
children’s future’ (Willetts 2010) is given literal expression, in the claim that the act of voting 
represents an unfair imposition of the Boomers’ enhanced ‘generational democratic weight’ 
(Gardiner 2016b) against the democratic choices of younger people. Although few claimsmakers 
have explicitly argued for voting to be weighted according to a citizen’s age, the repetition of the 
claim that Brexit represented a vote made at young people’s expense, by people who had less time 
to live and therefore the least to lose, indicates a symbolic de-authorisation of the senior vote. In a 
similar way, generationalist generalisations frame discussions about the ‘youth vote’, assuming that 
all members of the current younger generation will vote homogenously, in a particular direction 
(Kingman 2017; Bristow 2019). 
The impact of claimsmaking activity 
In this context of a consolidated sense of generational grievance, it is worth attending to the impact 
of claimsmaking activity on the rhetoric surrounding the Brexit vote that is apparent in national 
newspapers. Claims about the problem of ‘intergenerational equity’ emerged in the USA in the 
1980s (Quadango 1990; Walker 1996) and were given political form by the organisation Americans 
for Generational Equity (AGE), which, although now defunct, had ‘considerable influence on the 
emergence of the issue of intergenerational equity and in its reshaping of political discourse’ (Cook 
2002). In the UK, however, explicit campaigning around the ‘generational equity’ cause is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. This work can be linked to the work of individual claimsmakers, who published 
high-profile books and associated articles promoting the argument that the Baby Boomers ‘took’ or 
‘failed’ the future (Willetts 2010; Beckett 2010), resulting in a ‘jilted’ generation of ‘bankrupted’ 
youth (Howker and Malik 2010). Howker and Malik were involved in the establishment, in 2011, of 
the Intergenerational Foundation, to draw attention to the question of ‘fairness between the 
generations’ and to ‘get a fairer deal for young people’ (Intergenerational Foundation 2018). Willetts 
chaired the Intergenerational Commission that, as noted above, was established in 2016 to promote 
the need for ‘intergenerational equity’ policies (Intergenerational Commission 2018b). 
Since 2011, claimsmaking activity around the ‘Boomer problem’ in the UK has developed in two 
intriguing respects. As noted above, the launch of the Intergenerational Commission supplied the 




‘intergenerational fairness’ agenda in mainstream policy circles. Yet there has also been a growing 
awareness of the potentially divisive implications of Boomer blaming. For example, Lord Filken, 
Chairman of the Centre for Ageing Better and a participant in the Intergenerational Commission, was 
moved to caution in a letter to ​The Times​ (London): 
The EU referendum result showed different voting patterns at different ages but it's 
important not to generalise or overstate differences between generations… We must not 
blame older generations for the conditions created by the wider economic context of the 
past 50 years, and we must acknowledge that there are large income inequalities within 
generations as well as between them. (​Times​ 2016) 
 
The institutionalisation of generationalist claimsmaking, combined with a sensitivity to accusations 
that such claimsmaking might fuel intergenerational divisions, has resulted in a noticeable rhetorical 
shift, where campaigners present their endeavours as attempts to heal existing generational 
divisions. Thus, in an article published in July 2016, Intergenerational Commission leaders David 
Willetts and Torsten Bell emphasised the depth and significance of the ‘generational divide in voting 
patterns’ exposed by the EU Referendum. They echoed the sentiment of generational grievance, 
arguing that ‘[t]hose who will live longest with the costs and benefits of leaving the EU voted 
overwhelmingly for Remain’ and that ‘major policy failures have visibly and viscerally harmed the 
interests of younger generations’. However, they insisted: ‘these are symptoms of policy and 
political failure, not of a generational war. Indeed, it is the old who are in many cases most worried 
about the young or, as they call them, their children and grandchildren’ (Willetts and Bell 2016). 
 
This rhetorical shift takes as its starting point the consolidation of the assumption that there is a 
conflict of interests between the younger and older generations. The content of the central claim – 
that policy needs to address questions of ‘unfairness’ between the generations – has not changed. 
However, the ​context​ of this claim has changed from earlier attempts to establish it. Analysis of the 
media narrative of post-Brexit Boomer blaming indicates that the assumption of generational 
conflict between Boomers and Millennials has now become culturally ingrained: allowing 
claimsmakers to present their work as healing the very divisions between the generations that their 
advocacy work has attempted to highlight. The claim that ‘it is the old who are in many cases most 
worried about the young’ is rhetorically used as a statement of support for politics and policies 
designed to ‘address [the intergenerational] divide directly’ (Willetts and Bell 2016): despite 




(Shrimpton ​et al.​ 2017), suggesting a lack of broad public support for such policies (see also 
discussion in Cook 2002; Hamblin 2016).  
 
Discussion: Implications for ‘the problem of generations’  
In analysing the claim that the Baby Boomers are ‘to blame’ for Brexit, this study contributes to the 
field of the construction of social problems, by identifying the development and extension of claims 
about generational conflict in the context of economic austerity and a divisive political event. By 
taking a constructivist approach to analysing how the cultural script of generational conflict is 
developed by claimsmakers, and amplified and extended by journalists writing for newspapers, we 
can deepen our understanding of ‘the way culture is ​used’​ (Swidler 2001, p. 5, emphasis in original) 
in the consolidation of a generationalist narration of social, political, and economic problems.  
With regard to the Brexit vote, we can see that generationalism has become positioned as a frame 
through which political conflicts about much wider national, social, and political issues – such as 
Britain’s membership of the EU – can be rapidly, and often uncontroversially, interpreted. This has 
troubling implications for our understanding both of current events, and of generation itself. In the 
case explored here, a political issue that was not primarily about generation became reposed as a 
conflict between old and young. This reposition was effected, not by those individuals who cast their 
vote on the question of Leave or Remain, but by claimsmakers driven by particular agendas – for 
example, to promote the social problem of generational unfairness, or to de-legitimise the outcome 
of the referendum result. In this regard, other social and cultural factors that shaped both the Brexit 
vote and the media reaction to it, such as class, social status, and geographical location, were 
minimised by the generation frame, while the presumed commonalities in opinion and experience of 
people of particular ages was overstated.  
Understanding the influence of generationalism, as a simplified view of generation that is mobilised 
to narrate wider social and political problems, can also help us to clarify the concept of ​generation 
within the current context. In theorising the interaction between wider social events and 
generational consciousness, Mannheim added depth and nuance to sociological understandings of 
how relations between history and biography come to be worked through. He described 
generational location as analogous to class location: people are born into a particular generation, 
and as such share an experience of the world. However, generational location does not itself give 
rise to generational consciousness: the emergence of an ‘actual generation’ depends on the 
interplay with wider social forces, and members of this generation will work up their experiences in 




of a generation is the outlook of the generation unit that most clearly expresses the ​Zeitgeist​,​ ​rather 
than the opinion or experience of an entire cohort (see discussion in Bristow 2015, 2016).  
Mannheim’s theory remains a powerful basis for understanding how it is we come to talk about 
generations – and what we mean when we do so. However, it is acknowledged that Mannheim’s 
theory of generational consciousness cannot help us to understand ​everything ​about generations: 
for example, the complex web of personal relations and social contexts that frame people’s 
experience over the life course (Pilcher 1995; Hareven 2000). Indeed, the increasing use (and, 
arguably, over-use and abuse) of the concept of ‘social generations’ has been charged with applying 
a homogenising and reductive logic to social categorisation, which subsumes arguably more 
significant effects of class, gender, ethnicity, and geographical location (France and Roberts 2015). 
The exaggeration of cultural differences ​between​ different generations, as illustrated by the 
narrative of post-Brexit Boomer blaming, tends to minimise the significance of shared interests, 
experiences, and aspirations that are held ​across ​the generations, thereby limiting the 
intergenerational conversation necessary for the transmission and renewal of knowledge 
(Mannheim 1952). 
The impact of generationalism means that discussions about​ ​the Baby Boomer generation in the 
present-day context are framed by a range of very contemporary concerns. The meaning of the 
‘Baby Boomer generation’ is thus socially constructed, not only by the factors that gave rise to its 
own generational consciousness, but by ideas ​about​ the Baby Boomers that have developed in a 
later context, in which ‘generational thinking’ has become an increasingly significant political and 
cultural frame (White 2013). A similar dilemma emerges with discussions about the ‘Millennials’ – 
the ‘other generation’ in the drama of the generation wars. Much of the debate about the 
Millennials has been scripted by claimsmakers talking about, or on behalf of, the ‘younger 
generation’, writing a wide array of social, cultural, political, and economic anxieties into a 
pre-existing script of generational tension and conflict. In the narrative of ‘victims and villains’ (Best 
2017) that characterised generationalist claimsmaking following the Brexit vote, Millennials were 
portrayed in a generally sympathetic light. However, in wider cultural discussions of the Millennials, 
negative stereotypes also abound (Bristow 2019); and as Marwick wryly noted five decades ago, 
‘there is probably always one final sanction on the power of youth: the process of growing older’ 
(Marwick 1970, p. 51). 
 
Conclusion 
Disentangling authentic expressions of generational consciousness from the ascendant 




post-Referendum Britain; but one that the generational dimension of the sociology of knowledge 
should urgently consider. This study has revealed that, in the narrative offered by UK national 
newspapers, cultural assumptions regarding the depth and definitiveness of the ‘age divide’ in the 
Referendum vote have fused with particular generational stereotypes to construct the post-factual 
claim that the Baby Boomers, ​as a generation​, are to blame for Brexit. In this context, it behoves 
sociologists to go beyond such reductive accounts, to understand the deeper dynamics at work in 
the construction and amplification of this claim, and to approach an understanding of how and why 
the concept of generation has become weaponised in the current socio-political moment.  
 
Bibliography 
Allen, V. (2017). ‘Baby Boomer “used as term of abuse since the Brexit vote”’. ​Daily Mail, ​30 
November.  
Auer, J. (2013). ​Baby Boomers: Busting the Myths​. Prospect Hill: Pink Gum Publishing. 
Altheide, D. L. (1996). ​Qualitative Media Analysis. ​Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Becker, H. S. (1997 [1963]). ​Outsiders: Studies in Sociology of Deviance​ (new edn). New York: Free 
Press. 
Beckett, F. (2010). ​What Did the Baby Boomers Ever Do For Us? Why the children of the sixties lived 
the dream and failed the future. ​London: Biteback. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1991 [1966]). ​The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. ​London: Penguin.  
Best, J. (2003). ‘But Seriously Folks: The limitations of the strict constructionist interpretation of 
social problems.’ In​ ​J.A. Holstein and G. Miller (eds), ​Challenges and Choices: Constructionist 
perspectives on social problems. ​New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 51-69. 
  Best, J. (2017). ​Social Problems.​ New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Boult, A. (2016). ‘Millennials' “fury” over Baby Boomers' vote for Brexit.’ ​Telegraph​, 24 June.  
Bristow, J. (2015) ​Baby Boomers and Generational Conflict.​ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 





Bristow, J. (2019) ​Stop Mugging Grandma: The ‘generation wars’ and why Boomer blaming won’t 
solve anything.​ London: Yale University Press. 
Chu, B. (2016). ‘If you think millennials are complainers who haven't been hard done by, you need to 
hear the facts.’ ​Independent​, 19 July. 
Cohen, S. (2011 [1972]). ​Folk Devils and Moral Panics​. London and New York: Routledge. 
Cook, F. L. (2002). ‘Generational Equity.’ ​Encyclopedia of Ageing​. Gale Group Inc.  
 
Cooper, C. (2016). ‘Millennials will see two recessions before the age of 30. Brexit is turning a clash 
of generations into a crisis.’ ​Independent​, 24 June. 
 
Curtis, C. (2017). ‘The demographics dividing Britain.’ YouGov, 25 April. Retrieved from: 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/04/25/demographics-dividing-britain 
France, A. and Roberts, S. (2015). ‘The problem of social generations: a critique of the new emerging 
orthodoxy in youth studies’. ​Journal of Youth Studies​, 18(2), pp. 215-230. 
Gardiner, L. (2016a). ​Stagnation Generation: The case for renewing the intergenerational contract. 
London: Resolution Foundation.  
Gardiner, L. (2016b). ​Votey McVoteface: Understanding the growing turnout gap between the 
generations​. London: Resolution Foundation.  
Graham-Harrison, E. (2016). ‘Young people on the EU referendum: 'It is the end of one world, of the 
world as we know it.' ​Observer,​ 26 June. 
Hamblin, K. (2016). ‘Older People’. In P. Alcock, T. Haux, M. May, & S. Wright (eds) ​The Student’s 
Companion to Social Policy​ (5​th​ edn). London: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 432-438. 
Hareven, T. K. (2000). ​Families, History, and Social Change: Life-Course and Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives.​ Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Howker, E. and Malik, S. (2010). ​Jilted Generation: How Britain has bankrupted its youth. ​London: 
Icon. 
Intergenerational Commission. (2018). Homepage. Retrieved from: 
https://www.intergencommission.org/ 





Intergenerational Foundation. (2018b). ‘About’. Retrieved from: ​http://www.if.org.uk/the-issue/ 
 
Kertzer, D. I. (1983) ‘Generation as a Sociological Problem.’ ​Annual Review of Sociology​ (9), pp. 
125-149. 
Kingman, D. (2017) ​Generation Remain: Understanding the Millennial vote.​ London: 
Intergenerational Foundation.  
Lodge, E., Carnell, E. and Coleman, M. (2016). ​The New Age of Ageing: How society needs to change​. 
Bristol:  Policy Press. 
Loseke, D. R. (2003). ‘Constructing conditions, people, morality, and emotion.’ In J. A. Holstein and G. 
Miller, ​Challenges and Choices: Constructionist perspectives on social problems​.​ ​New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter, pp. 120-129. 
Mannheim, K. (1952). ​Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge​. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.  
Marwick, A. (1970). ‘Youth in Britain, 1920-1960: Detachment and commitment.’ ​Journal of 
Contemporary History​ 5 (1), pp. 37-51. 
Matthews, A. (2016). ‘“This vote doesn't represent the younger generation who will have to live with 
the consequences”: Millennials vent fury at Baby Boomers for voting Britain OUT of the EU.’ ​Mail​, 24 
June.  
Mills, C. W. (1970 [1959]). ​The Sociological Imagination.​ Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Moore, J. (2016a). ‘Interest rates are on hold for now, but they could still head down and that means 
bad news for Baby Boomer Brexiters.’ ​Independent, ​14 July.  
Moore, J. (2016b). ‘Baby Boomers, you have already robbed your children of their future. Don't 
make it worse by voting for Brexit.’ ​Independent, ​22 June. 
Moore, P. (2016). ‘How Britain Voted.’ YouGov, 27 June. Retrieved from : 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted 
Nash, L. L. (1978). ‘Concepts of Existence: Greek Origins of Generational Thought.’ ​Daedalus​ 107 (4), 
pp. 1-21. 
Phillipson, C., Leach, R., Money, A., and Biggs, S. (2008). ‘Social and Cultural Constructions of Ageing: 




Pilcher, J. (1994). ‘Mannheim’s Sociology of Generations: An Undervalued Legacy.’ ​The British 
Journal of Sociology​ 45(3), pp. 481-495. 
Pilcher, J. (1995). ​Age and Generation in Modern Britain. ​Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Purhonen, S. (2016). ‘Generations on paper: Bourdieu and the critique of “generationalism”’. ​Social 
Science Information​, 55(1), pp. 94-114. 
Quadagno, J. (1990). ‘Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state.’ ​International Journal 
of Health Services​ 20(4), pp. 631-49. 
Ready for Ageing Alliance (2015). ​The Myth of the Baby Boomer​. London: Ready for Ageing Alliance.  
Resolution Foundation (2016). ‘Millennials facing “generational pay penalty” as their earnings fall 
£8,000 behind during their 20s.’ Press release, 18 July. Retrieved from: 
https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/press-releases/millennials-facing-generational-pay-pe
nalty-as-their-earnings-fall-8000-behind-during-their-20s/ 
Shrimpton, H., Skinner, G. and Hall, S. (2017). ​The Millennial Bug: Public attitudes on the living 
standards of different generations​. London: Resolution Foundation. 
Spitzer, A. B. (1973). ‘The Historical Problem of Generations’. ​The American Historical Review​ 78 (5), 
pp. 1353-1385. 
Swidler, A. (2001) ​Talk of Love: How culture matters. ​Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press.  
Times​ (2016). ‘The generation gap and how it can be closed; Letters to the Editor.’ 20 July. 
Walker, A. (ed). (1996). ​The New Generational Contract: Intergenerational relations, old age and 
welfare. ​London: UCL Press. 
White, J. (2013). ‘Thinking Generations.’ ​British Journal of Sociology​ 64 (2), pp. 216-247. 
Willetts, D. (2010). ​The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers took their children’s future – and why they 
should give it back.​ London: Atlantic Books. 
Willetts, D. and Bell, T. (2016). ‘After Brexit, we must strengthen the ties between young and old; 
That responsibility has been taken far too lightly in recent years with little attention paid to the 
intergenerational impact of big public policy decisions.’ ​Observer​, 3 July. 
Wohl, R. (1980). ​The Generation of 1914​. London:​ ​Weidenfeld & Nicolson.  




Woodward, G. ‘Brexit is Baby Boomers’ ultimate betrayal’, ​Yorkshire Post​, 24 June. 
https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/opinion/grant-woodward-brexit-is-baby-Boomers-ultimate-
betrayal-1-7981175 
 
 
 
21 
 
